

THE EVOLUTION OF SPECIAL FORCES IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: The British and American Experiences, J. Paul de B. Taillon, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2001, 190 pages, \$62.50.

The title is the only mistake in this book. Special Forces did not evolve *in* counterterrorism; it evolved *into* counterterrorism. While counterterrorism might be the topic currently in vogue, the other missions of Special Forces remain. Overall, this brief book does an excellent job showing how Special Forces evolved in Britain and the United States.

Britain, with its perpetual Northern Ireland Training Area and colonial experience, has the advantage of an institutional memory and a military of veterans with practical experience. America's experience has been more eclectic. J. Paul de B. Taillon points out that America has also been prone to fashionable attitudes toward special operations. Contrasting the two experiences, the author finds that the British stress the human element of Special Forces, while the United States stresses technology. Both are necessary; however, Taillon finds the reliance on technology to be self-defeating.

Along with the history of the respective Special Forces establishments, Taillon identifies principles of unconventional warfare, which will be useful to scholars in the field. Of relevance to the title, Taillon argues the need for international cooperation against terrorism. Far from writing antiterrorist platitudes, he argues specific areas in which nations can share technology, information, and expertise.

**K.L. Jamison, Attorney at Law,
Gladstone, Missouri**

THE UNION THAT SHAPED THE CONFEDERACY: Robert Toombs and Alexander H. Stephens, William C. Davis, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2001, 284 pages, \$29.95.

William C. Davis's latest book, *The Union that Shaped the Confederacy: Robert Toombs and Alexander Stephens*, is an unusual biography of a friendship between two men who were influential in antebellum Georgia politics and in the founding of the Confederacy. Although they were opposites in personality and physical size, Toombs and Stephens were close friends and political allies.

The story is interesting in that Toombs and Stephens were embraced as moderates to free the nascent nation from fire-eater radicals such as Robert Rhett and William Yancey. Confederate President Jefferson Davis marginalized Toombs and Stephens, and ironically, they joined the fire-eaters in their opposition to Davis's policies. Toombs seemed to personally resent Davis for beating him out of the office of president while Stephens vehemently opposed Davis's antilibertarian policies, especially the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Davis has done his usual thorough job of investigating the subject of the interplay between forces of political moderation and radicalism, pride, and ambition in the mid-1800s. The story that results is well worth reading.

**LTC D. Jon White, USA,
Smithfield, Virginia**

MAO'S CHINA AND THE COLD WAR, Chen Jian, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, 400 pages, \$49.95.

In *Mao's China and the Cold War*, Chen Jian interprets the course of Sino-American relations between 1945 and 1972 through nine cases, using newly accessible Chinese archival sources. He also provides a useful bibliographical essay outlining the major works on these cases. Because many archives are still closed, these studies are not definitive, but they begin to illuminate the reasons for Chinese perceptions and behavior.

Originally published as separate journal articles, the studies have been revised in light of the author's more recent research. The book's force comes from the repetition of Chen Jian's major themes, which unite the decisions Mao Tse-tung and Chinese leaders made in these disparate cases. The themes include a sense of geopolitical reality; an obligation and mission to aid fraternal communist parties and promote anti-imperialist revolutionary movements worldwide; the dominant force of Mao's personality; and the use of foreign affairs to promote a domestic political agenda. While these several motifs recur throughout the period, the major ones are the dominance of Mao's personality in the

Chinese state and his use of foreign policy to promote a political agenda that accentuated permanent revolution to create a new man.

China occupied a unique position in the Cold War because it was the object of both the affections and hostility of the two major powers. Mao's policy was to establish and maintain China's independence by destroying the nascent Russo-American division of the world that emerged from Yalta by placing China in a central position in world politics. Mao's was a foreign policy that was both Chinese and communist; the emphasis depended on circumstances. Chen Jian points out that despite the theories of the realists, ideology is important. Mao managed to project China onto the world stage and have it taken seriously despite its economic and military weakness. Chen Jian also convincingly demonstrates that foreign-policy crises were used to promote national mobilization in China.

Chen Jian aims for contemporary relevance as he discusses the last of the cases and its implications. He points out that the Communist Party's domestic disasters, culminating in Lin Biao's failed coup in 1971, resulted in a crisis of revolutionary faith. An ideologically driven state loses its legitimacy when its people believe neither in its future nor in its ideology. The crisis of faith that began in 1971 has been exacerbated by Deng Xiaoping's opening of China to the West since 1980 and the resulting inter- and intra-regional economic growth and income disparities that have obliterated Maoist egalitarianism and its exaltation of poverty. These incidents have led the Chinese Communist Party to become more Chinese as it abandons communist ideology. According to Chen Jian, this means that the Taiwan issue has greater importance than it had during the Cold War. China's domestic needs have always driven foreign policy, and the refusal to fore-swear the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue indicates that communist leaders believe they have a legitimacy crisis. Having thrown its ideology overboard in pursuit of prosperity, China must emphasize its nationalist claims to bolster its authority. Chen Jian's hope that China will be able to make the right choices rationally seems warranted, but he

acknowledges that the next 20 years will be trying ones for China's rulers.

I recommend this book for those curious about contemporary Chinese diplomatic history, the relationship between domestic and foreign policy under Mao, and possible future courses for Chinese policy.

**Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D.,
Huntsville, Alabama**

THE DYNAMICS OF MILITARY REVOLUTION, 1300-2050,

MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., Cambridge University Press, NY, 2001, 224 pages, \$27.95.

Much has been written recently about military revolutions, and much of it represents truly useful analysis. Some, however, is jargon-riddled rubbish. *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* belongs to the former category. The book's two editors, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray have written widely and well on the topic of military revolutions. In preparing this collection, they enlisted the services of some of the best military historians working today, among them Dennis Showalter, John Lynn, Clifford Rogers, and Holger Herwig.

Together, the contributors examine famous and not-so-famous examples of dramatic periods of change in warfare and the environment of war. Beginning with the 14th century military system of Edward III of England, the topics include the early modern revolution (exemplified in the French Army of Louis XIV); the transformation of war that followed in the wake of the French Revolution and Napoleon; the battlefleet revolution led by Britain's Jackie Fisher; the creation of the three-dimensional battlefield in World War I, and the blitzkrieg revolution unleashed by the Germans 20 years later.

Knox and Murray provide the thread linking these case studies in their opening essay "Thinking About Revolutions in Warfare." Military revolutions, write Knox and Murray, are cataclysms that reshape governments and societies as well as militaries. The military revolution of the 17th century helped found the modern nation-state and led to a Western military preeminence that has endured into the 21st century.

In the editors' view, revolutions in

military affairs (RMAs) take place within the broader framework of military revolutions and involve a conceptual rethinking of the conduct of warfare, usually within a subcategory of war. So, for example, the leading role aircraft carriers assumed in the American and Japanese fleets during World War II represents an RMA in the subcategory of naval warfare. This carrier revolution occurred as a sort of aftershock to the broader military revolution that took place during World War I.

Even if Murray and Knox had limited their book to historical cases, they would have given us enough to chew on. There is much to energize reflection and debate among military professionals. However, they conclude the book with a summary essay that reminds us that all analysis of military change must occur within a strategic context.

They are not sanguine about U.S. efforts to apply the appropriate strategic analysis to efforts to anticipate change. They find that senior military leaders tend to be technological utopians incapable of using historical perspectives and cultural insights to shape the future military. They argue that the officers who endured the Vietnam experience understand that technology is not a substitute for well-grounded concepts and doctrine. Unfortunately, as such officers leave the ranks, they are replaced by anti-intellectuals who are captive to the mechanistic approaches favored by a Robert McNamara-influenced Pentagon.

Whether one agrees with the editors' assessment or not, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* will reward historians and military professionals alike. This book belongs on the reading lists of officers from all four services.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AT CUSTER'S SIDE: The Civil War Writings of James Harvey Kidd, Eric J. Wittenberg, ed., Kent State University Press, Kent, OH, 2001, 140 pages, \$35.00.

The preeminent biographer of Brevet Brigadier General James H. Kidd, the quintessential companion and historical chronicler of General George Armstrong Custer and his Michigan Wolverine Brigade, returns with another glimpse into the wartime

exploits of the "Boy General." Eric J. Wittenberg offers a collection of Kidd's speeches and writings that delve into the character of the legendary cavalryman and Indian fighter. From the dedication of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade Monument to a comprehensive sketch of Custer's life, Kidd describes events as only a talented and prolific writer can.

At Custer's Side is a companion volume to Kidd's memoirs and the collection of his letters. The book completes Wittenberg's literary efforts to bring to life the "trials and tribulations of the horse soldiers who followed Custer's guidon." In drawing his Custer trilogy to a close, Wittenberg once again explores the tragedy of The Battle of Little Big Horn, an event for which Kidd resolutely fixes blame on Custer's subordinate commanders Major Marcus Reno and Captain Frederick Benteen. *At Custer's Side*, however, is much more than a retelling of an epic of the Indian Wars; Wittenberg presents Kidd at his finest, as an exceptional orator and writer and as a genuine figure from a time long passed.

Originally intended to serve as appendixes to Wittenberg's earlier collection of Kidd's writings, *One of Custer's Wolverines, The Civil War Letters of Brevet Brigadier General James H. Kidd, 6th Michigan Cavalry* (Kent State University Press, Ohio, 2000), *At Custer's Side* is an exceptional first-person account of the Civil War exploits of one of America's most colorful military organizations and is a valuable addition to any library of "Custeriana."

**MAJ Steven Leonard, USA,
Fort Campbell, Kentucky**

THE WILD BLUE: The Men and Boys Who Flew the B-24s Over Germany, Stephen E. Ambrose, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001, 299 pages, \$26.00.

There has been considerable material written about World War II Army Air Forces. *The Wild Blue: The Men and Boys Who Flew the B-24s Over Germany* is a compelling story of heroism, commitment, and death on a scale perhaps not matched since that time. The majority of the information in the record focuses on the men of the Eighth Air Force headquartered in England and on the Boeing B-17 heavy bomber. Far less has been chronicled on the other

theaters of the war or the other American heavy bomber—the Consolidated B-24. In his latest book, *In the Wild Blue*, Stephen Ambrose attempts to shed light on these lesser-known subjects.

Ambrose is no stranger to World War II stories, especially from the perspective of the individual fighting man. He is the author of several best sellers about World War II, most notably *Citizen Soldier: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945* (Touchstone Books, New York, 1998) and *D Day: June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II* (Touchstone Books, New York, 1995), which are excellent books. In *The Wild Blue*, Ambrose tells the story of Lieutenant George McGovern, a B-24 pilot and member of the Fifteenth Air Force headquartered in Italy. McGovern survived the war and became a U.S. Senator, and in 1972 he was the Democrat Party candidate for President.

While the book centers on McGovern and his crew, it also tells the story of countless other B-24 crewmembers and Army Air Forces veterans. However, this is also the book's flaw; it is almost impossible to follow. The individual accounts provide interesting reading, but Ambrose's movement between characters is routinely awkward and distracting.

Ambrose does a credible job of telling the McGovern story, but unfortunately, he misses the mark on the B-24 story. The B-24 was active in all theaters of the war, not just Italy. Missing are the accounts of the 1943 raid on the Ploesti oil refineries in which only B-24s participated, and losses neared 40 percent. Also missing is the entire B-24 story in the Pacific Theater where the B-24 proved far superior to the B-17. Finally, where is the story of the rookie crew of the B-24 named *Lady Be Good* who overshot their base at Benghazi while returning from their first mission? They perished in the Libyan desert, and the crash site was only discovered in 1958.

In the end, the story of the B-24s and their crews remains untold. While some portions of this book are interesting, most readers, especially those interested in World War II

aviation, will find Ambrose's work incomplete.

**MAJ Ted J. Behncke, Sr., USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

APRIL 1865: The Month That Saved America, Jay Winik, HarperCollins, NY, 2001, 461 pages, \$32.50.

Jay Winik rightly argues that April 1865 was an essential cornerstone in American history. With maybe a touch of hyperbole, he asserts that April was "perhaps the most . . . crucial month . . . in the life of the United States." Civil War scholars certainly would agree that the events of that April were essential, but whether they could be considered the most decisive in the history of the Republic is another matter. Historians could reasonably argue that July 1776, October 1781 (the surrender at Yorktown), or even July 1863 with Union victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg were as decisive as April 1865.

Winik bases his contention on General Robert E. Lee's decision not to disperse the Army of Northern Virginia and conduct a guerrilla campaign, the fall of Richmond, the surrender at Appomattox, the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, and the transfer of power to Vice President Andrew Johnson. Certainly such a campaign would have had dire consequences not only for the South, but also for the Nation as a whole. These contentions are strong points in his favor. Had any of these events turned out differently, history might have been changed.

Other strengths are Winik's analysis of the Constitution and whether states actually had the right to secede; an extensive discussion about arming slaves; Lincoln's views of giving blacks the right to vote; and the precedents for presidential succession, particularly John Tyler's succeeding William Henry Harrison in 1841; and the consequences of the surrender of Confederate General Joe Johnston's Army of Tennessee to Union General William T. Sherman after Lincoln's murder.

There are several areas that detract from Winik's work. The first is his tendency to go off on tangents. For example, he attempts to compare and contrast Lee's march westward from Appomattox with the 1942 Bataan Death March, and he de-

votes 12 pages to Lincoln's background while admitting that "nothing . . . about his background recommended Lincoln to the daunting task he was about to face." Lincoln's views on slavery were relevant, and Winik does address them, but they get lost in detail.

Winik's unconventional style of footnotes (a combination of bibliographical essay, highlighted words, and phrases) is cumbersome. Also, there are too many instances where information that should have been footnoted is not. For example, Winik states that Davis "vows to fight on," yet there is no source for Davis's vow. Winik quotes a letter from Lee but provides no note as to when it was written, to whom, or where it can be found. These are serious shortcomings in a scholarly work. Finally, although he devotes approximately 16 pages to Johnston's surrender in North Carolina, the surrenders of Confederate armies in North Carolina, Alabama, and the Trans-Mississippi Department are barely mentioned. Winik should have drawn a closer, more direct, connection between Lee's surrender and the decisions by commanders in those areas to capitulate. One paragraph is hardly adequate.

April 1865 has received advance praise from several noted historians for its subject matter and readability. At the risk of offending those luminaries, I found the book at times to be difficult to follow because of the "rabbit trails" Winik follows. Even in the conclusion Winik describes the physical setting of post-war Washington—a subject that has no relation to April 1865. I also consider the lack of footnotes and the style of those he provides to be serious weaknesses. That said, the book does address areas of great national importance that had a dramatic effect on the United States as we know it today, and thus, the book is a significant contribution to the historiography of the American Civil War.

**LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA, Retired,
Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas**

GERMAN ANGLOPHOBIA AND THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918, Matthew Stibbe, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001, 267 pages, \$59.95.

This book examines the German mentality toward the English during

World War I. Matthew Stibbe draws from archives, personal correspondence, and newspapers. The primary arrangement is chronological, but various topics are addressed in each chapter. After introductory information, the focus is developed into the debate surrounding German war aims vis-à-vis annexations and unrestricted submarine warfare.

The book is well written and moves at a fair pace. One important note is that if the reader is not knowledgeable in German, it would be a good idea to have a reference handy because of German terms and newspaper names. This book has value for the defense community as a tool to understanding the mentality of a people and how they were affected and influenced by propaganda and the popular media.

One side note: Stibbe refers to the British people as English. The explanation for doing this is that he sees referring to them as English as derogatory. He equates the use with his view that the British were imperial mercantilists. This also leads to the word anglophobia rather than something like "Britophobia."

Overall, the theoretical framework seems logically formulated. The only major problem is the conclusion. The book purports to deal with anglophobia during World War I, but the lion's share of the conclusion discusses anglophobia and the Nazi party during the interwar period; it never seems to make its point about German anglophobia.

**SPC David Schepp, USA,
Fort Benning, Georgia**

DAY OF DECEIT: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor, Robert B. Stinnett, Touchstone Books, NY, 2001, 399 pages, \$16.00.

Robert B. Stinnett is a World War II Navy veteran who later joined the *Oakland Tribune* as a photographer and journalist. Stinnett also wrote *George Bush: His World War II Years* (Diane Publishing Co., Collingsdale, PA, 1992).

Essentially, the theme of *Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor* is reflected in its title. The questions are "What did U.S. intelligence know about Japanese intentions?" "What did U.S. intelligence communicate to the President of the United States?" "What

did the President do with the information?"

This book is controversial, and as I read it, my thoughts swung from believing Franklin D. Roosevelt knew about Japanese intentions to believing he knew nothing. If he knew what Japanese intentions were, then why did he not instruct that such information be distributed to the appropriate personnel and offices?

Day of Deceit has a large number of endnotes, references, and facsimiles of relevant documents that are useful for further research. Reading the book and judging its validity is a research project in its own right. I recommend this book, but not because I believe it represents historical fact or because I agree with its conclusions, but because it provides information about a subject that will be discussed and debated long into the future.

**Richard L. Milligan, Ph.D., Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas**

PEARL HARBOR STORY, Henry Dozier Russell, Mercer University Press, Macon, GA, 2001, 160 pages, \$19.00.

Major General Henry Dozier Russell, a member of the U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Investigation Board, which finished its work in 1944, stated, "I doubt if at any critical time in our history our interests were in the hands of a weaker group of men than those constituting the War Department in December 1941." As a member of the Board, Russell was sworn to secrecy, an oath he promised to himself to violate as soon as the war was over. This book is Russell's testimony of the Board's activities and findings. He dictated it in 1946, but it was unpublished until now. To appreciate the book, one must appreciate the man.

Russell was a National Guardsman who, by his own admission, had little faith in active-duty soldiers. Before the war, Russell was the commanding officer of the 30th Division. Once the war began, the Army retired or reassigned many National Guard leaders in favor of Regular Army officers. Russell was not excepted: "I was relieved from the command of the Division and sent before a reclassification board. . . . Such conditions were created by the Regular Army as a part

of an overall policy to eliminate the National Guard as a major component of the Army of the United States. It was my firm belief that Chief of Staff [George C.] Marshall played a large part in the formulation and execution of this anti-National Guard policy. Certain it is that his conduct in the purge of the 30th Division was utterly and almost unbelievably reprehensible."

Despite his training as a lawyer, which dictated his impartiality and his protestations of always trying to be fair, his anger toward the Regular Army, in general, and Marshall, in particular, seethes throughout the book. Russell's anger is so great that anyone who gives testimony supporting Marshall is painted as either part of a great military conspiracy to cover up the truth or as totally inept.

Russell feels with equal vigor that General Walter Short was made a scapegoat. All testimony against Short is downplayed and invariably Short's mistakes are the result of malfeasance by Marshall (or at the least, the stupidity of Marshall's school-trained staff officers). This attitude is so pervasive as to become distracting. Worse, it hides important lessons that can be learned from the mistakes of the past. However, once past the hyperbole, the reader finds fascinating lessons learned—some of which we are still learning.

Problems associated with a lack of a unified commander; of living in a peacetime democracy yet preparing for war; of writing orders with an eye on culpability; of having too much authority vested in one individual; and of course its corollary, not having enough authority vested in subordinates, are all indicated in the failures at Pearl Harbor. The reader will even find a hint of the dangers associated with political correctness in the intelligence community at not spying on the Japanese because we were not yet at war and did not want to offend them. The book, a fascinating foray into the workings of the War Department in 1941 and the Army Pearl Harbor Investigation Board, gives an interesting picture of how and why the United States was caught so completely by surprise.

**LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC,
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